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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BARBARA DRAKE, : 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, : Case No. 940769-CA 
FHP OF UTAH, and TRANSAMERICA 
INSURANCE CO., : 
Respondents. : Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ms. Drake's accident occurred while she was on a special 
errand delivering medical referrals for the benefit of her 
employer. Injuries occurring both going to and coming from the 
site of a special errand are compensable. Ms. Drake had not 
deviated from the scope of her special errand at the time of her 
accident. The fact that she had an intent to, at some point in the 
future, deviate from her special errand is irrelevant. Under the 
facts of this case, Ms. Drake was injured in extremely close 
proximity to the Ogden FHP. Ms. Drake7s injuries are therefore 
compensable under Utah law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PORTIONS OF RESPONDENTS STATEMENT OF FACTS ARE IRRELEVANT 
AND INACCURATE. 
The last sentence of paragraph 12 on page 5 of 
Respondent's brief is obviously irrelevant and should be completely 
disregarded. The fact that Ms. Drake was "cited for an improper 
turn" is a brazen and improper attempt to introduce the alleged 
fault of Ms. Drake in making a U-turn. It is axiomatic that the 
fault of an employee is an improper consideration in determining 
the compensability of an accident. Respondent is aware of this 
principle, yet persists in drawing attention to this fact. The 
reason is clear. Respondent is attempting to defer the Court's 
attention away from the merits of the case and toward an assessment 
of irrelevant and prejudicial facts. Petitioner, therefore, urges 
this Court to disregard the last sentence of paragraph 12 on page 
5 of Respondent's Brief. 
II. MS. DRAKE'S ACCIDENT IS COMPENSABLE UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Respondent attempts to distinguish State Tax Commission 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984). The 
employee in State Tax Commission was injured in an automobile 
accident while driving to a two-month seminar. Id. at 1052. 
Respondent argues that the finite nature of the training program is 
a distinguishing fact. However, driving every day for two months, 
or for a quarter or semester in Dimmia v. Workmen's Compensation 
Bd. , 495 P.2d at 439, all show that the employee's travel was 
ongoing and frequent. Despite the frequency of the travel, the 
courts found injuries on the frequent special errand compensable. 
Ms. Drake satisfies the factors enumerated in State Tax Commission. 
The delivery of referrals was for the benefit and at the direction 
of her employer. The ability to, on occasion, leave early was 
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consideration for the delivery. The delivery of referrals was 
related to her job, although not a part of her formal job duties. 
Although Ms. Drake7s journey to deliver referrals may not have been 
particularly onerous or hazardous, it was inconvenient. Id. at 
1055. 
Finally, Lundgerg v. Cream 0' Weber/Fed. Dairy, 465 P.2d 
175 (Utah 1970) does not involve a delivery but instead an early 
morning meeting that required no deviation from the employee7s 
ordinary route to work. Ms. Drake went out of her way on her way 
home to deliver documents for FHP. She had to take a different 
route home which constituted a five mile deviation. Therefore, 
Lundgerg is inapplicable. 
III. RESPONDENT'S OUT-OF-STATE CASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE. 
Respondent relies on two Florida decisions: El Vieio Arco 
Iris, Inc. v. Luaces, 395 So.2d 225 (Fla. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1981), 
rev. denied, 402 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1981) and Radomski v. Great 
Bicycle Shop, Inc., 464 So.2d 1346 (Fla. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1985), 
Respondent does not discuss the more relevant and recent case of 
Electronic Service Clinic v. Barnard, 634 So.2d 707 (Fla. App. 1 
Dist. 1994). In Electronic Service, David Barnard worked as a 
television repairman in Bradenton, Florida, although he worked in 
an adjoining town of Valrico. Id. 708. Mr. Barnard typically used 
a company van to perform repairs and also used the van to drive to 
and from work. Id. In addition, Mr. Barnard did not receive 
compensation for overtime. Id. at 708 n.l. On February 4, 1992, 
Mr. Barnard worked an exceptionally long day. Id. Because the 
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company van had been in disrepair, Mr. Barnard drove a company-
provided rental car to and from work in addition to using the van 
for deliveries. Id. Also, a co-worker accompanied Mr. Barnard on 
his jobs that day. Id. At the end of the day, Mr. Barnard dropped 
off the co-worker at the work site, rather than going directly 
home, and then drove home. Id. On the way home, Mr. Barnard was 
seriously injured in an automobile accident. Id. at 709. 
Mr. Barnard's employer attempted to escape liability by 
arguing that "the errand ended once the claimant returned the 
truck, dropped off his co-worker, and began driving home." Id. at 
709. Like FHP in the instant case, the employee attempted to rely 
on the El Vieio decision. Id. The court distinguished El Vieio, 
noting that the employer has "confused the attainment of the 
errand's objective with the more critical question of the 
completion of the errand's burden." Id. The court explained: 
Thus, in El Vieio, the claimant was deemed to 
have completed his special errand not because 
the objective had been accomplished once the 
supplies were purchased; indeed, one could 
argue that the objective was not accomplished 
until the claimant delivered the supplies to 
the job site the next day. Rather, the errand 
was complete at the time of the purchase 
because the additional burden the errand 
placed upon the claimant had been performed at 
the time, and nothing remained but the 
claimant's resumption of his ordinary trip 
home. In the instant case by contrast, the 
burden of the errand included the lengthy 
round trip, and the errand could not be deemed 
complete until the trip ended. 
Id. at 710. 
Similarly, Ms Drake's delivery of referrals was not on 
her ordinary trip home. Respondent had never disputed this fact. 
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See Respondents Statement of Facts, para. 6, ("The deviation from 
Ms. Drake/s normal trip home was approximately five miles."). It 
was never disputed that Ms. Drake would take two entirely different 
routes home depending on whether she was delivering the referrals. 
(R. 171). The plumber's assistant in El Vieio, "merely resumed his 
usual trip home that he would have made regardless of the special 
errand." Id. at 709. In the instant case the parties do not 
dispute the fact that Ms. Drake was not on her usual trip home and 
also that the reason she was not on her usual trip home was because 
of her delivery. (R. 171). 
More importantly is the court's recognition that the 
nature of a delivery involves not only dropping off the delivery 
but also returning from the site of the delivery. While the 
employer's only concern is whether the delivery has been made, this 
does not end the burden imposed on the employee by the delivery. 
Logically, in order to deliver something, one has to leave or 
return from the delivery site. Wisely, the Florida Court of 
Appeals recognized the distinction between the "attainment of the 
errand's objective" versus "the more critical question of the 
completion of the errand's burden." Id. at 709. Thus, the court 
explicitly recognized that injuries incurred while leaving, as well 
as travelling to, the site of a special errand are compensable. 
Ms. Drake's case is analogous. Had Ms. Drake's delivery 
taken place on her normal trip home, instead of requiring a five 
mile deviation, then injuries occurring on her ordinary route home 
would not be compensable. However, as has already been 
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established, Ms. Drake was not on her normal route home. 
Accordingly, the Florida cases cited by Respondent are 
distinguishable. Ms. Drake urges this Court to follow the closer 
Florida case of Electronic Service Clinic v. Barnard. 634 So.2d 707 
(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1994). 
The remainder of the out-of-state cases cited by 
Respondent are distinguishable. Radomski v. Great Bicycle Shop, 
Inc. , 446 So.2d 1346 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1985) did not involve a 
delivery of items on the way home or any deviation caused by such 
a delivery. Instead, the employee merely went to work at a 
different location on his normal day off. Id. at 1346-47. The 
court observed that: 
At the time of the accident, the claimant was 
going home. He was on no mission for his 
employer and was doing nothing for the benefit 
of his employer. He did not intend to stop in 
route home for any reason for the benefit of 
the employer. He was carrying some personal 
tools that he owned but this was not for his 
own convenience. The claimant did not intend 
to work that evening at home. 
Id. at 1347. 
By contrast, Ms. Drake delivered documents on the way 
home from work. The delivery required Ms. Drake to deviate five 
miles from her normal course home. Radomski is therefore 
distinguishable. Similarly in Kammever v. Board of Education, 393 
S.W.2d 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) the teacher was not delivering any 
documents which required a deviation from her normal route to or 
from work. Instead, the teacher slipped and fell outside the 
school on her way to an open house. This situation is more 
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analogous to normally going to work than embarking on a special 
errand. For instance, if FHP required Ms. Drake to attend an early 
meeting in Salt Lake City and she was injured on the way. These 
are not the facts of the instant case. 
The last two cases discussed by Respondent, Gregg v. 
Dorchester County School System, 241 S.E.2d 554 (S.C. 1978) and 
Evans v. Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau, 790 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 
1990) bare little resemblance to the facts presented by Ms. Drake's 
case. Neither involve a delivery requiring any deviation from the 
employee's normal course home. Both were injured either on their 
way to or from a meeting or place of employment, but were doing 
nothing on the trip to benefit their employer. Conversely, Ms. 
Drake7s trip itself benefitted her employer. As part of her trip 
and deviation from her normal course home, she performed an 
important duty on the part of her employer. It is this fact, the 
delivery of documents en route requiring an attendant deviation, 
which makes Ms. Drake7s injuries work-related. These facts are 
notably absent from every case cited by Respondent. 
In addition, Respondent7s analysis of Petitioner's out-
of-state cases is misplaced. While Petitioner realizes that the 
special errand exception is a fact sensitive inquiry, Petitioner 
still maintains the cases cited by Petitioner are more closely 
analogous. For instance, Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc. 568 P.2d 
233 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) is an instance of an employee regularly 
engaging in a special errand, contrary to Respondent's assertion 
that compensability should be uniformly denied in such an instance. 
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In addition, the employee was injured while leaving a special 
errand. Dimmia v. Workmen's Compensation Board. 495 P.2d 433 (Cal. 
1972) again involved an employee injured while leaving a special 
errand. Further, Respondent cites language which actually favors 
compensating Ms. Drake's injuries. The court noted that lf[t]he 
school attendance was extraordinary in relation to Dimmig's routine 
duties at Memorex." Id. at 439 (cited on page 18 of Respondent's 
Brief). Similarlyf the delivery of referrals was extraordinary in 
relation to her routine duties at FHP. 
Respondent attempts to distinguish Jonas v. Lillvbad, 137 
N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 1965) by focusing on the fact that the activity 
occurred outside normal working hours. This reading ignores the 
fact that (1) Ms. Drake's delivery often took her outside normal 
working hours and; (2) that the employee in Jonas was travelling 
away from the special errand. For the same reason, Respondent's 
analysis of Felton v. Hospital Guild of Thomasville, 291 S.E.2d 158 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) is misplaced. 
Next Respondent addresses Charak v. Leddv, 261 N.Y.S.2d 
486 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) stating that: 
It cannot be doubted that, had the Charak 
court been faced with a situation where the 
attorney had finished her responsibilities at 
the court, returned to the office and then 
left the office to return home, only to be 
injured at that time, portal to portal 
coverage would not apply. 
Respondent7s Brief, page 20. 
Respondent seems to suggest that the employee's injuries 
were compensable because she was going to a special errand, but 
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that the injuries would not be compensable if she was leaving the 
special errand. The Charak case does not suggest such a result. 
In addition, Respondent concedes that "had Ms. Drake been 
injured on her way to the Ogden office, she would have been in the 
course of employment, and any injury regardless of how egregious 
her conduct, would likely have been covered." Thus, Respondent 
concedes the nature of Ms. Drake's journey was a special errand, 
but offers the defense that because she was leaving, rather than 
going to the site of the special errand, her accident is not 
compensable. There is a case authority compensating employee 
injured leaving the site of a special errand. Dimmig v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeals Board, 495 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1972) and Electronic 
Service Clinic v. Barnard, 634 So.2d 707 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1994). 
Finally, in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Worker's Compensation 
Appeals Board, 163 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1980) 
Respondent relies on the fact that the employee worked an extra 
long shift and ignores the fact that the employee was injured at 
his home when he got out of his car. However, Ms. Drake did not 
make it to her driveway, she was injured in close proximity to FHP. 
(R. 684)(map of area). 
IV. MS. DRAKE HAD NOT, AT THE TIME OP THE ACCIDENT, DEVIATED FROM 
HER BUSINESS DELIVERY. 
Respondents make much of Ms. Drake's mens rea. At the 
time she was injured, Ms. Drake was planning on picking up her 
children at a daycare in close proximity to her residence. The 
only thing that was not work-related about Ms. Drake's accident was 
her state of mind. Respondent chooses to focus on Ms. Drake's 
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state of mind in the hope that the actual facts of the case will be 
lost. Ms. Drake was injured in close proximity to the FHP. By way 
of explanation, the Ogden FHP is right off the highway 1-15. (R. 
684 map of general area) Ms. Drake submitted a map of the relevant 
areas which is contained in the record. (R. 684) . A close 
examination of the map will reveal that Ms. Drake's accident 
occurred nearly adjacent to the FHP site. Further, whatever her 
intention was, at the time of the accident, Ms. Drake never had the 
opportunity to deviate from the delivery route. She never made it 
past the surrounding area of FHP. Therefore, under the specific 
facts of this case, Ms. Drake was still within the scope of her 
delivery at the time of her injury. 
The portion of Larson cited by Respondent is 
inapplicable. Exhibit D notes a straight line with no deviation 
required of the delivery. As has been discussed, Ms. Drake was 
forced by the delivery to deviate from her normal course home. The 
portion of Larson cited would apply if Ms. Drake's normal course 
home was 1-15. It was not. Her normal course home was Mountain 
Road and then down Harrison Boulevard. Section 19.24 of Larson 
does not address the fact situation presented by the instant case. 
The only similar fact Respondent can point to is the fact that Ms. 
Drake was leaving the site of the delivery at the time of her 
accident. This problem has already been discussed and is discussed 
in other, more relevant, portions of Larson. See Petitionees 
Brief, p. 10-11. 
Although deviations from business trips and special 
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errands do occur and are recognized at law, Ms. Drake did not 
deviate from her special errand. Ms. Drake testified that she was 
injured directly outside the FHP by the highway. (R. 172) Because 
the location of the accident is important, Petitioner urges the 
Court to review the map and the accident report specifying the 
address of the accident. The precise location of the accident 
shows that Ms. Drake was within the scope of her special errand at 
the time of the accident, notwithstanding the fact that she had an 
intent at some point in the future to leave her special errand. 
Such an intent is harbored by all who conduct special errands. Ms. 
Drake's home and her child care were in close proximity, 
approximately five miles away from the site of the accident. FHP 
has not shown what different route Ms. Drake would have taken if 
she simply had decided to go directly home rather than pick up her 
children at day care. Ms. Drake had a long way to go before she 
would deviate from her route home from the special errand before 
she went to pick up her children. At the time of the accident, Ms. 
Drake was still within the scope of her special errand. 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR COVERAGE OF MS. DRAKE'S ACCIDENT. 
FHP suggests that if Ms. Drake's accident is compensable, 
then "any injury which may have occurred on the slopes at Sun 
Valley would be covered under the worker's compensation statute." 
Respondent's Brief, p.12. Ms. Drake concedes that had she taken a 
trip to Sun Valley she would have deviated from her special errand. 
However, Ms. Drake was not at Sun Valley when injured. Instead, 
she was within approximately one half mile away from FHP at the 
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at the time of her accident. She had not yet had the opportunity 
to deviate from her special errand. Thus, the absurd hypothetical 
posed by FHP is not present in the instant case. Whether Ms. Drake 
was on a special errand is a fact-specific inquiry. Therefore, 
lines will have to be drawn dependent on the specific facts 
presented by each individual case. However, this is not a 
troubling case that will open the flood-gates of claims by those 
injured making special deliveries. Ms. Drake was still within the 
scope of her special errand in Ogden, Utah in a location in close 
proximity to FHP. 
Finally, FHP had the ultimate control over its risk under 
the worker's compensation statute. FHP's shuttle system was not 
operating efficiently. Referrals were not being delivered in a 
timely fashion. Rather than fix the shuttle system by hiring more 
drivers or buying more vehicles, FHP chose to have Ms. Drake 
deliver referrals after work. FHP and its customers benefitted by 
Ms. Drake's deliveries. By having Ms. Drake deliver referrals, FHP 
exposed itself to greater liability under the worker's compensation 
statute. If FHP did not want Ms. Drake covered on her trip home, 
its remedy was simple - fix the shuttle system. FHP did not do 
this. FHP's policy argument that it should not be exposed to 
liability for the actions of Ms. Drake over which it had no 
control, ignores the fact that it decided to have Ms. Drake perform 
these deliveries. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Drake was within the scope and course of employment 
- 12 -
at the time of her accident. Her delivery of referrals to the 
Ogden FHP constitutes a special errand. Ms. Drake was still under 
the burden of the special errand occasioned by the deviation the 
special errand required. At the time of the accident, she had not 
yet had the opportunity to deviate from the special errand. 
Therefore, Ms. Drake asks that the Industrial Commission's decision 
denying her claim be reversed and the ALJ's decision granting her 
claim be reinstated. 
DATED this t> day of \J WCAt , 1995. £  KllUCA  
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER / ) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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